x86/kexec: Do not map kexec area as decrypted when SEV is active

x86/kexec: Do not map kexec area as decrypted when SEV is active

When a virtual machine panics, its memory needs to be dumped for
analysis. With memory encryption in the picture, special care must be
taken when loading a kexec/kdump kernel in a SEV guest.

A SEV guest starts and runs fully encrypted. In order to load a kexec
kernel and initrd, arch_kexec_post_{alloc,free}_pages() need to not map
areas as decrypted unconditionally but differentiate whether the kernel
is running as a SEV guest and if so, leave kexec area encrypted.

 [ bp: Reduce commit message to the relevant information pertaining to
   this commit only. ]

Co-developed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430074421.7852-2-lijiang@redhat.com