security/loadpin: Allow to exclude specific file types

Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
other files kernel loads.

Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
[kees: fix array size issue reported by Coverity via Colin Ian King]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
index 32070762d24c44f0efc47a7bb1e99e2cf9d18291..716ad9b23c9aa73115c21ee86538cf99cd7ec173 100644 (file)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/LoadPin.rst
@@ -19,3 +19,13 @@ block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
 created to toggle pinning: ``/proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled``. (Having
 a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
 sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
+
+It's also possible to exclude specific file types from LoadPin using kernel
+command line option "``loadpin.exclude``". By default, all files are
+included, but they can be excluded using kernel command line option such
+as "``loadpin.exclude=kernel-module,kexec-image``". This allows to use
+different mechanisms such as ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG`` and
+``CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG`` to verify kernel module and kernel image while
+still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of other files kernel loads. The
+full list of valid file types can be found in ``kernel_read_file_str``
+defined in ``include/linux/fs.h``.

diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 055fb0a6416932c89d7933514f95993bf46b8f68..9e826041da41b2598b4dda8b2b14e4e486f48134 100644 (file)
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
 }
 
 static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
+static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID];
+static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID] __ro_after_init;
 static struct super_block *pinned_root;
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
 
@@ -129,6 +131,13 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
        struct super_block *load_root;
        const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
 
+       /* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
+       if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
+           ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
+               report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded");
+               return 0;
+       }
+
        /* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
        if (!file) {
                if (!enforce) {
@@ -187,10 +196,47 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
 };
 
+static void __init parse_exclude(void)
+{
+       int i, j;
+       char *cur;
+
+       /*
+        * Make sure all the arrays stay within expected sizes. This
+        * is slightly weird because kernel_read_file_str[] includes
+        * READING_MAX_ID, which isn't actually meaningful here.
+        */
+       BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files) !=
+                    ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id));
+       BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str) <
+                    ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id));
+
+       for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) {
+               cur = exclude_read_files[i];
+               if (!cur)
+                       break;
+               if (*cur == '\0')
+                       continue;
+
+               for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id); j++) {
+                       if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) {
+                               pr_info("excluding: %s\n",
+                                       kernel_read_file_str[j]);
+                               ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1;
+                               /*
+                                * Can not break, because one read_file_str
+                                * may map to more than on read_file_id.
+                                */
+                       }
+               }
+       }
+}
+
 static int __init loadpin_init(void)
 {
        pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
                enforce ? "" : "not ");
+       parse_exclude();
        security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
        return 0;
 }
@@ -203,3 +249,5 @@ DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
 /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
 module_param(enforce, int, 0);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
+module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types");