netfilter: nf_conntrack_tcp: Fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options
authorJozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Wed, 30 Mar 2016 09:34:35 +0000 (11:34 +0200)
committerPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Thu, 7 Apr 2016 16:42:37 +0000 (18:42 +0200)
Baozeng Ding reported a KASAN stack out of bounds issue - it uncovered that
the TCP option parsing routines in netfilter TCP connection tracking could
read one byte out of the buffer of the TCP options.  Therefore in the patch
we check that the available data length is large enough to parse both TCP
option code and size.

Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c

index 278f3b9356efdcd37ca3d1aacb62f03e57db7e3c..7cc1d9c22a9fa757d1f752dfcb4c8e928c4c9e11 100644 (file)
@@ -410,6 +410,8 @@ static void tcp_options(const struct sk_buff *skb,
                        length--;
                        continue;
                default:
+                       if (length < 2)
+                               return;
                        opsize=*ptr++;
                        if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */
                                return;
@@ -470,6 +472,8 @@ static void tcp_sack(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int dataoff,
                        length--;
                        continue;
                default:
+                       if (length < 2)
+                               return;
                        opsize = *ptr++;
                        if (opsize < 2) /* "silly options" */
                                return;