commoncap: don't alloc the credential unless needed in cap_task_prctl

In function cap_task_prctl(), we would allocate a credential
unconditionally and then check if we support the requested function.
If not we would release this credential with abort_creds() by using
RCU method. But on some archs such as powerpc, the sys_prctl is heavily
used to get/set the floating point exception mode. So the unnecessary
allocating/releasing of credential not only introduce runtime overhead
but also do cause OOM due to the RCU implementation.

This patch removes abort_creds() from cap_task_prctl() by calling
prepare_creds() only when we need to modify it.

Reported-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index b9d613e0ef143b36bd411246d1ce1f42f00738b0..9fe46e22c7f259538197c84b8180d4cffad8baf8 100644 (file)
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -822,15 +822,20 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
  * Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP.  Attempt to remove the specified capability from
  * the current task's bounding set.  Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
  */
-static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
+static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
 {
+       struct cred *new;
+
        if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
                return -EPERM;
        if (!cap_valid(cap))
                return -EINVAL;
 
+       new = prepare_creds();
+       if (!new)
+               return -ENOMEM;
        cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);
-       return 0;
+       return commit_creds(new);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -848,26 +853,17 @@ static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
 int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                   unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
 {
+       const struct cred *old = current_cred();
        struct cred *new;
-       long error = 0;
-
-       new = prepare_creds();
-       if (!new)
-               return -ENOMEM;
 
        switch (option) {
        case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
-               error = -EINVAL;
                if (!cap_valid(arg2))
-                       goto error;
-               error = !!cap_raised(new->cap_bset, arg2);
-               goto no_change;
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               return !!cap_raised(old->cap_bset, arg2);
 
        case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
-               error = cap_prctl_drop(new, arg2);
-               if (error < 0)
-                       goto error;
-               goto changed;
+               return cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
 
        /*
         * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
@@ -889,10 +885,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
         * capability-based-privilege environment.
         */
        case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
-               error = -EPERM;
-               if ((((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
-                    & (new->securebits ^ arg2))                        /*[1]*/
-                   || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))   /*[2]*/
+               if ((((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
+                    & (old->securebits ^ arg2))                        /*[1]*/
+                   || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))   /*[2]*/
                    || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))   /*[3]*/
                    || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
                                    current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
@@ -906,46 +901,39 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                         */
                    )
                        /* cannot change a locked bit */
-                       goto error;
+                       return -EPERM;
+
+               new = prepare_creds();
+               if (!new)
+                       return -ENOMEM;
                new->securebits = arg2;
-               goto changed;
+               return commit_creds(new);
 
        case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
-               error = new->securebits;
-               goto no_change;
+               return old->securebits;
 
        case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
-               if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
-                       error = 1;
-               goto no_change;
+               return !!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
 
        case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
-               error = -EINVAL;
                if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
-                       goto error;
-               error = -EPERM;
+                       return -EINVAL;
                if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
-                       goto error;
+                       return -EPERM;
+
+               new = prepare_creds();
+               if (!new)
+                       return -ENOMEM;
                if (arg2)
                        new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
                else
                        new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
-               goto changed;
+               return commit_creds(new);
 
        default:
                /* No functionality available - continue with default */
-               error = -ENOSYS;
-               goto error;
+               return -ENOSYS;
        }
-
-       /* Functionality provided */
-changed:
-       return commit_creds(new);
-
-no_change:
-error:
-       abort_creds(new);
-       return error;
 }
 
 /**