Pull keys fixes from James Morris:
"Notable here is a rewrite of big_key crypto by Jason Donenfeld to
address some issues in the original code.
From Jason's commit log:
"This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with
get_random_bytes_wait, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at
boot time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were
even deeper underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems
to have been committed with very little crypto review. So, I rewrote
the whole thing, trying to keep to the conventions introduced by the
previous author, to fix these cryptographic flaws."
There has been positive review of the new code by Eric Biggers and
Herbert Xu, and it passes basic testing via the keyutils test suite.
Eric also manually tested it.
Generally speaking, we likely need to improve the amount of crypto
review for kernel crypto users including keys (I'll post a note
separately to ksummit-discuss)"
* 'fixes-v4.14-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
security/keys: properly zero out sensitive key material in big_key
KEYS: use kmemdup() in request_key_auth_new()
KEYS: restrict /proc/keys by credentials at open time
KEYS: reset parent each time before searching key_user_tree
KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key
KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer in keyring_read()
KEYS: fix key refcount leak in keyctl_read_key()
KEYS: fix key refcount leak in keyctl_assume_authority()
KEYS: don't revoke uninstantiated key in request_key_auth_new()
KEYS: fix cred refcount leak in request_key_auth_new()