crypto: lrw - don't access already-freed walk.iv

If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv.  But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.

Fix this in the LRW template by checking the return value of
skcipher_walk_virt().

This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation.  When the extra
self-tests were run on a KASAN-enabled kernel, a KASAN use-after-free
splat occured during lrw(aes) testing.

Fixes: c778f96bf347 ("crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

diff --git a/crypto/lrw.c b/crypto/lrw.c
index 0430ccd08728655ecf4e44c65ef16e956bd928c1..b6666c595a6866cfe06c3f443fa96995cb4a550f 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/lrw.c
+++ b/crypto/lrw.c
@@ -162,8 +162,10 @@ static int xor_tweak(struct skcipher_request *req, bool second_pass)
        }
 
        err = skcipher_walk_virt(&w, req, false);
-       iv = (__be32 *)w.iv;
+       if (err)
+               return err;
 
+       iv = (__be32 *)w.iv;
        counter[0] = be32_to_cpu(iv[3]);
        counter[1] = be32_to_cpu(iv[2]);
        counter[2] = be32_to_cpu(iv[1]);