If for some reason an association's fragmentation point is zero,
sctp_datamsg_from_user will try to endlessly try to divide a message
into zero-sized chunks. This eventually causes kernel panic due to
running out of memory.
Although this situation is quite unlikely, it has occurred before as
reported. I propose to add this simple last-ditch sanity check due to
the severity of the potential consequences.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Audykowicz <jakub.audykowicz@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
return false;
}
+static inline __u32 sctp_min_frag_point(struct sctp_sock *sp, __u16 datasize)
+{
+ return sctp_mtu_payload(sp, SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT, datasize);
+}
+
#endif /* __net_sctp_h__ */
* the packet
*/
max_data = asoc->frag_point;
+ if (unlikely(!max_data)) {
+ max_data = sctp_min_frag_point(sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk),
+ sctp_datachk_len(&asoc->stream));
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("%s: asoc:%p frag_point is zero, forcing max_data to default minimum (%Zu)",
+ __func__, asoc, max_data);
+ }
/* If the the peer requested that we authenticate DATA chunks
* we need to account for bundling of the AUTH chunks along with
__u16 datasize = asoc ? sctp_datachk_len(&asoc->stream) :
sizeof(struct sctp_data_chunk);
- min_len = sctp_mtu_payload(sp, SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT,
- datasize);
+ min_len = sctp_min_frag_point(sp, datasize);
max_len = SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN - datasize;
if (val < min_len || val > max_len)