include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=haproxy
-PKG_VERSION:=1.8.17
-PKG_RELEASE:=2
+PKG_VERSION:=1.8.19
+PKG_RELEASE:=1
PKG_SOURCE:=haproxy-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/src/
-PKG_HASH:=7b789b177875afdd5ddeff058e7efde73aa895dc2dcf728b464358635ae3948e
+PKG_HASH:=64f5fbfd4e09ffeaf26cb6667398ba780704a14e96e60000caa8bf69962ba734
PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(BUILD_VARIANT)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION)
PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0
#!/bin/bash
CLONEURL=http://git.haproxy.org/git/haproxy-1.8.git
-BASE_TAG=v1.8.17
+BASE_TAG=v1.8.19
TMP_REPODIR=tmprepo
PATCHESDIR=patches
+++ /dev/null
-commit 6648ff0cccee04a6a0c0e64050151b5d6c5bac51
-Author: Jarno Huuskonen <jarno.huuskonen@uef.fi>
-Date: Fri Jan 4 14:05:02 2019 +0200
-
- DOC: http-request cache-use / http-response cache-store expects cache name
-
- Adds missing cache name option to http-request cache-use and
- http-response cache-store documentation.
-
- Also adds optional if/unless condition to
- 10.2.2. Proxy section: http-request cache-use / http-response cache-store
-
- (cherry picked from commit 251a6b72a8b6f0a4b167f6a2960e422d682aed80)
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit 5376f6af9239fdf8a79b6c912387de12e3c9d6cd)
- [wla: no http-request/response section in 1.8]
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
-index 4f999e25..712e56e2 100644
---- a/doc/configuration.txt
-+++ b/doc/configuration.txt
-@@ -17157,13 +17157,13 @@ max-age <seconds>
- 10.2.2. Proxy section
- ---------------------
-
--http-request cache-use <name>
-+http-request cache-use <name> [ { if | unless } <condition> ]
- Try to deliver a cached object from the cache <name>. This directive is also
- mandatory to store the cache as it calculates the cache hash. If you want to
- use a condition for both storage and delivering that's a good idea to put it
- after this one.
-
--http-response cache-store <name>
-+http-response cache-store <name> [ { if | unless } <condition> ]
- Store an http-response within the cache. The storage of the response headers
- is done at this step, which means you can use others http-response actions
- to modify headers before or after the storage of the response. This action
--- /dev/null
+--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
++++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ #include <netdb.h>
+ #include <netinet/tcp.h>
+
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+@@ -60,6 +61,17 @@
+ #include <openssl/async.h>
+ #endif
+
++#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION
++#define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
++#define OpenSSL_version(x) SSLeay_version(x)
++#define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
++#endif
++
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#define X509_getm_notBefore X509_get_notBefore
++#define X509_getm_notAfter X509_get_notAfter
++#endif
++
+ #include <import/lru.h>
+ #include <import/xxhash.h>
+
+@@ -217,7 +229,7 @@ static struct {
+ .capture_cipherlist = 0,
+ };
+
+-#ifdef USE_THREAD
++#if defined(USE_THREAD) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
+
+ static HA_RWLOCK_T *ssl_rwlocks;
+
+@@ -1716,8 +1728,8 @@ ssl_sock_do_create_cert(const char *servername, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(newcrt), HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&ssl_ctx_serial, 1));
+
+ /* Set duration for the certificate */
+- if (!X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(newcrt), (long)-60*60*24) ||
+- !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newcrt),(long)60*60*24*365))
++ if (!X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(newcrt), (long)-60*60*24) ||
++ !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(newcrt),(long)60*60*24*365))
+ goto mkcert_error;
+
+ /* set public key in the certificate */
+@@ -6299,7 +6311,7 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_x_notafter(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char
+ goto out;
+
+ smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
+- if (ssl_sock_get_time(X509_get_notAfter(crt), smp_trash) <= 0)
++ if (ssl_sock_get_time(X509_getm_notAfter(crt), smp_trash) <= 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash;
+@@ -6399,7 +6411,7 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_x_notbefore(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char
+ goto out;
+
+ smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
+- if (ssl_sock_get_time(X509_get_notBefore(crt), smp_trash) <= 0)
++ if (ssl_sock_get_time(X509_getm_notBefore(crt), smp_trash) <= 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash;
+@@ -8976,10 +8988,12 @@ static void __ssl_sock_init(void)
+ #endif
+
+ xprt_register(XPRT_SSL, &ssl_sock);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ SSL_library_init();
++#endif
+ cm = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+ sk_SSL_COMP_zero(cm);
+-#ifdef USE_THREAD
++#if defined(USE_THREAD) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
+ ssl_locking_init();
+ #endif
+ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+@@ -9008,8 +9022,8 @@ static void __ssl_sock_init(void)
+ #else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
+ "\nRunning on OpenSSL version : %s%s",
+- SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION),
+- ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ^ SSLeay()) >> 8) ? " (VERSIONS DIFFER!)" : "");
++ OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION),
++ ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ^ OpenSSL_version_num()) >> 8) ? " (VERSIONS DIFFER!)" : "");
+ #endif
+ memprintf(&ptr, "%s\nOpenSSL library supports TLS extensions : "
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+@@ -9100,12 +9114,14 @@ static void __ssl_sock_deinit(void)
+ }
+ #endif
+
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ ERR_remove_state(0);
+ ERR_free_strings();
+
+ EVP_cleanup();
++#endif
+
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+ #endif
+ }
+++ /dev/null
-commit a64e5574e40e3e0819c82e35a7e3d2fa65febc73
-Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
-Date: Fri Jan 11 19:38:25 2019 +0100
-
- BUG/MAJOR: cache: fix confusion between zero and uninitialized cache key
-
- The cache uses the first 32 bits of the uri's hash as the key to reference
- the object in the cache. It makes a special case of the value zero to mean
- that the object is not in the cache anymore. The problem is that when an
- object hashes as zero, it's still inserted but the eb32_delete() call is
- skipped, resulting in the object still being chained in the memory area
- while the block has been reclaimed and used for something else. Then when
- objects which were chained below it (techically any object since zero is
- at the root) are deleted, the walk through the upper object may encounter
- corrupted values where valid pointers were expected.
-
- But while this should only happen statically once on 4 billion, the problem
- gets worse when the cache-use conditions don't match the cache-store ones,
- because cache-store runs with an uninitialized key, which can create objects
- that will never be found by the lookup code, or worse, entries with a zero
- key preventing eviction of the tree node and resulting in a crash. It's easy
- to accidently end up on such a config because the request rules generally
- can't be used to decide on the response :
-
- http-request cache-use cache if { path_beg /images }
- http-response cache-store cache
-
- In this test, mixing traffic with /images/$RANDOM and /foo/$RANDOM will
- result in random keys being inserted, some of them possibly being zero,
- and crashes will quickly happen.
-
- The fix consists in 1) always initializing the transaction's cache_hash
- to zero, and 2) never storing a response for which the hash has not been
- calculated, as indicated by the value zero.
-
- It is worth noting that objects hashing as value zero will never be cached,
- but given that there's only one chance among 4 billion that this happens,
- this is totally harmless.
-
- This fix must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8.
-
- (cherry picked from commit c9036c00044a8d81561113886ecec9a9ce71bd3b)
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit 5a6279fcc16da479304bcabc1705e8653f274337)
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/src/cache.c b/src/cache.c
-index 667cede3..3d8ed241 100644
---- a/src/cache.c
-+++ b/src/cache.c
-@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ enum act_return http_action_store_cache(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
- struct cache *cache = (struct cache *)rule->arg.act.p[0];
- struct shared_context *shctx = shctx_ptr(cache);
- struct cache_entry *object;
--
-+ unsigned int key = *(unsigned int *)txn->cache_hash;
-
- /* Don't cache if the response came from a cache */
- if ((obj_type(s->target) == OBJ_TYPE_APPLET) &&
-@@ -420,6 +420,10 @@ enum act_return http_action_store_cache(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
- if (txn->meth != HTTP_METH_GET)
- goto out;
-
-+ /* cache key was not computed */
-+ if (!key)
-+ goto out;
-+
- /* cache only 200 status code */
- if (txn->status != 200)
- goto out;
-@@ -478,7 +482,7 @@ enum act_return http_action_store_cache(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
-
- cache_ctx->first_block = first;
-
-- object->eb.key = (*(unsigned int *)&txn->cache_hash);
-+ object->eb.key = key;
- memcpy(object->hash, txn->cache_hash, sizeof(object->hash));
- /* Insert the node later on caching success */
-
-diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c
-index 7e4a8351..29a1083a 100644
---- a/src/proto_http.c
-+++ b/src/proto_http.c
-@@ -8210,6 +8210,7 @@ void http_init_txn(struct stream *s)
-
- txn->flags = 0;
- txn->status = -1;
-+ *(unsigned int *)txn->cache_hash = 0;
-
- txn->cookie_first_date = 0;
- txn->cookie_last_date = 0;
+++ /dev/null
-commit 9f01534cd68de78c74b50d7b8def07a72c2a3b49
-Author: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
-Date: Wed Jan 2 18:46:41 2019 +0100
-
- BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Disable anti-replay protection and set max data with 0RTT.
-
- When using early data, disable the OpenSSL anti-replay protection, and set
- the max amount of early data we're ready to accept, based on the size of
- buffers, or early data won't work with the released OpenSSL 1.1.1.
-
- This should be backported to 1.8.
-
- (cherry picked from commit 51088ce68fee0bae52118d6823873417046f9efe)
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit 6703b633078b6bae12395ee3e310427b37965d68)
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
-index 24ccc4b1..11655533 100644
---- a/src/ssl_sock.c
-+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
-@@ -3821,6 +3821,10 @@ ssl_sock_initial_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
- SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk);
- #elif (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)
-+ if (bind_conf->ssl_conf.early_data) {
-+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY);
-+ SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data(ctx, global.tune.bufsize - global.tune.maxrewrite);
-+ }
- SSL_CTX_set_client_hello_cb(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_cbk, NULL);
- SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_sock_switchctx_err_cbk);
- #else
+++ /dev/null
-commit aca7e5aed7e036489ccc83d925103e94653b8670
-Author: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
-Date: Tue Jan 8 15:35:32 2019 +0100
-
- DOC: Be a bit more explicit about allow-0rtt security implications.
-
- Document a bit better than allow-0rtt can trivially be used for replay attacks,
- and so should only be used when it's safe to replay a request.
-
- This should probably be backported to 1.8 and 1.9.
-
- (cherry picked from commit 69752964944ef9c8dc03477ee95bc7d149a72089)
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit bb0df71201ad5b2d0cec514773d244275e5240df)
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
-index 712e56e2..72b769a4 100644
---- a/doc/configuration.txt
-+++ b/doc/configuration.txt
-@@ -10483,7 +10483,10 @@ accept-proxy
-
- allow-0rtt
- Allow receiving early data when using TLSv1.3. This is disabled by default,
-- due to security considerations.
-+ due to security considerations. Because it is vulnerable to replay attacks,
-+ you should only allow if for requests that are safe to replay, ie requests
-+ that are idempotent. You can use the "wait-for-handshake" action for any
-+ request that wouldn't be safe with early data.
-
- alpn <protocols>
- This enables the TLS ALPN extension and advertises the specified protocol
+++ /dev/null
-commit 30cd01cbfd40201f3abe246216a85c69352aa79c
-Author: Emeric Brun <ebrun@haproxy.com>
-Date: Thu Jan 10 10:51:13 2019 +0100
-
- BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: missing allocation failure checks loading tls key file
-
- This patch fixes missing allocation checks loading tls key file
- and avoid memory leak in some error cases.
-
- This patch should be backport on branches 1.9 and 1.8
-
- (cherry picked from commit 09852f70e0ed0f23cf9287b1ce55bb6a60112f32)
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit a1dc55a63cfbc8f440b72b6def3957bf1fad12b2)
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
-index 11655533..7884c411 100644
---- a/src/ssl_sock.c
-+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
-@@ -7627,15 +7627,36 @@ static int bind_parse_tls_ticket_keys(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px
- }
-
- keys_ref = malloc(sizeof(*keys_ref));
-+ if (!keys_ref) {
-+ if (err)
-+ memprintf(err, "'%s' : allocation error", args[cur_arg+1]);
-+ return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
-+ }
-+
- keys_ref->tlskeys = malloc(TLS_TICKETS_NO * sizeof(struct tls_sess_key));
-+ if (!keys_ref->tlskeys) {
-+ free(keys_ref);
-+ if (err)
-+ memprintf(err, "'%s' : allocation error", args[cur_arg+1]);
-+ return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
-+ }
-
- if ((f = fopen(args[cur_arg + 1], "r")) == NULL) {
-+ free(keys_ref->tlskeys);
-+ free(keys_ref);
- if (err)
- memprintf(err, "'%s' : unable to load ssl tickets keys file", args[cur_arg+1]);
- return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
- }
-
- keys_ref->filename = strdup(args[cur_arg + 1]);
-+ if (!keys_ref->filename) {
-+ free(keys_ref->tlskeys);
-+ free(keys_ref);
-+ if (err)
-+ memprintf(err, "'%s' : allocation error", args[cur_arg+1]);
-+ return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
-+ }
-
- while (fgets(thisline, sizeof(thisline), f) != NULL) {
- int len = strlen(thisline);
-@@ -7647,6 +7668,9 @@ static int bind_parse_tls_ticket_keys(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px
- thisline[--len] = 0;
-
- if (base64dec(thisline, len, (char *) (keys_ref->tlskeys + i % TLS_TICKETS_NO), sizeof(struct tls_sess_key)) != sizeof(struct tls_sess_key)) {
-+ free(keys_ref->filename);
-+ free(keys_ref->tlskeys);
-+ free(keys_ref);
- if (err)
- memprintf(err, "'%s' : unable to decode base64 key on line %d", args[cur_arg+1], i + 1);
- fclose(f);
-@@ -7656,6 +7680,9 @@ static int bind_parse_tls_ticket_keys(char **args, int cur_arg, struct proxy *px
- }
-
- if (i < TLS_TICKETS_NO) {
-+ free(keys_ref->filename);
-+ free(keys_ref->tlskeys);
-+ free(keys_ref);
- if (err)
- memprintf(err, "'%s' : please supply at least %d keys in the tls-tickets-file", args[cur_arg+1], TLS_TICKETS_NO);
- fclose(f);
+++ /dev/null
-commit 98f9549fa466e3b73a04f17dbc05fd88427c72f4
-Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
-Date: Mon Jan 14 15:17:46 2019 +0100
-
- BUG/MINOR: backend: don't use url_param_name as a hint for BE_LB_ALGO_PH
-
- At a few places in the code we used to rely on this variable to guess
- what LB algo was in place. This is wrong because if the defaults section
- presets "balance url_param foo" and a backend uses "balance roundrobin",
- these locations will still see this url_param_name set and consider it.
- The harm is limited, as this only causes the beginning of the request
- body to be buffered. And in general this is a bad practice which prevents
- us from cleaning the lbprm stuff. Let's explicitly check the LB algo
- instead.
-
- This may be backported to all currently maintained versions.
-
- (cherry picked from commit 089eaa0ba73913187e93d52c3ea34faa01fd8f9c)
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit 70d1744bb41daab4110071e4855504b6dc47bda9)
- [wla: no htx in 1.8]
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c
-index 29a1083a..5dc562ff 100644
---- a/src/proto_http.c
-+++ b/src/proto_http.c
-@@ -3935,7 +3935,8 @@ int http_process_request(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
- * that parameter. This will be done in another analyser.
- */
- if (!(s->flags & (SF_ASSIGNED|SF_DIRECT)) &&
-- s->txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST && s->be->url_param_name != NULL &&
-+ s->txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST &&
-+ (s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_ALGO) == BE_LB_ALGO_PH &&
- (msg->flags & (HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN|HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK))) {
- channel_dont_connect(req);
- req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_BODY;
+++ /dev/null
-commit a5027f804144536f79829443b33e6c19c32b690a
-Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
-Date: Mon Jan 14 16:29:52 2019 +0100
-
- BUG/MINOR: backend: balance uri specific options were lost across defaults
-
- The "balance uri" options "whole", "len" and "depth" were not properly
- inherited from the defaults sections. In addition, "whole" and "len"
- were not even reset when parsing "uri", meaning that 2 subsequent
- "balance uri" statements would not have the expected effect as the
- options from the first one would remain for the second one.
-
- This may be backported to all maintained versions.
-
- (cherry picked from commit 602a499da5e81d6b4cfe8410f0fc6d53c1e06745)
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit f00758fde5961e3bebc508852faeee4d9d80b0e0)
- [wla: cfg_parse_listen() is still in cfgparse.c in 1.8]
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/src/backend.c b/src/backend.c
-index 87327f19..4c4044a6 100644
---- a/src/backend.c
-+++ b/src/backend.c
-@@ -1516,6 +1516,8 @@ int backend_parse_balance(const char **args, char **err, struct proxy *curproxy)
- curproxy->lbprm.algo |= BE_LB_ALGO_UH;
-
- curproxy->uri_whole = 0;
-+ curproxy->uri_len_limit = 0;
-+ curproxy->uri_dirs_depth1 = 0;
-
- while (*args[arg]) {
- if (!strcmp(args[arg], "len")) {
-diff --git a/src/cfgparse.c b/src/cfgparse.c
-index 94f29637..91bb802e 100644
---- a/src/cfgparse.c
-+++ b/src/cfgparse.c
-@@ -2844,7 +2844,10 @@ int cfg_parse_listen(const char *file, int linenum, char **args, int kwm)
-
- if (defproxy.url_param_name)
- curproxy->url_param_name = strdup(defproxy.url_param_name);
-- curproxy->url_param_len = defproxy.url_param_len;
-+ curproxy->url_param_len = defproxy.url_param_len;
-+ curproxy->uri_whole = defproxy.uri_whole;
-+ curproxy->uri_len_limit = defproxy.uri_len_limit;
-+ curproxy->uri_dirs_depth1 = defproxy.uri_dirs_depth1;
-
- if (defproxy.hh_name)
- curproxy->hh_name = strdup(defproxy.hh_name);
+++ /dev/null
-commit 7c6a6149a91d2e240a5a63f981c5d07d681df725
-Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
-Date: Mon Jan 14 17:07:39 2019 +0100
-
- BUG/MINOR: backend: BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE is a value, not a bit
-
- There are a few instances where the lookup algo is tested against
- BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE using a binary "AND" operation while this macro
- is a value among a set, and not a bit. The test happens to work
- because the value is exactly 4 and no bit overlaps with the other
- possible values but this is a latent bug waiting for a new LB algo
- to appear to strike. At the moment the only other algo sharing a bit
- with it is the "first" algo which is never supported in the same code
- places.
-
- This fix should be backported to maintained versions for safety if it
- passes easily, otherwise it's not important as it will not fix any
- visible issue.
-
- (cherry picked from commit 6c30be52da3d949a8dd6fb5e2de7319c031e656e)
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit 48147c424680b7e887fb176662d58d87baa16098)
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/src/backend.c b/src/backend.c
-index 4c4044a6..0cf14cfd 100644
---- a/src/backend.c
-+++ b/src/backend.c
-@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_sh(struct proxy *px, const char *addr, int len,
- if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
- h = full_hash(h);
- hash_done:
-- if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
-+ if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
- return chash_get_server_hash(px, h, avoid);
- else
- return map_get_server_hash(px, h);
-@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_uh(struct proxy *px, char *uri, int uri_len, co
- if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
- hash = full_hash(hash);
- hash_done:
-- if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
-+ if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
- return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
- else
- return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
-@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_ph(struct proxy *px, const char *uri, int uri_l
- if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
- hash = full_hash(hash);
-
-- if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
-+ if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
- return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
- else
- return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
-@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_ph_post(struct stream *s, const struct server *
- if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
- hash = full_hash(hash);
-
-- if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
-+ if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
- return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
- else
- return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
-@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_hh(struct stream *s, const struct server *avoid
- if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
- hash = full_hash(hash);
- hash_done:
-- if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
-+ if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
- return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
- else
- return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
-@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static struct server *get_server_rch(struct stream *s, const struct server *avoi
- if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_HASH_MOD) == BE_LB_HMOD_AVAL)
- hash = full_hash(hash);
- hash_done:
-- if (px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
-+ if ((px->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
- return chash_get_server_hash(px, hash, avoid);
- else
- return map_get_server_hash(px, hash);
-@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ int assign_server(struct stream *s)
- case BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE:
- case BE_LB_LKUP_MAP:
- if ((s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_KIND) == BE_LB_KIND_RR) {
-- if (s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
-+ if ((s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
- srv = chash_get_next_server(s->be, prev_srv);
- else
- srv = map_get_server_rr(s->be, prev_srv);
-@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ int assign_server(struct stream *s)
- * back to round robin on the map.
- */
- if (!srv) {
-- if (s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
-+ if ((s->be->lbprm.algo & BE_LB_LKUP) == BE_LB_LKUP_CHTREE)
- srv = chash_get_next_server(s->be, prev_srv);
- else
- srv = map_get_server_rr(s->be, prev_srv);
+++ /dev/null
-commit 93b3994091b5bd17b43c9d91ecae470d33157e25
-Author: Tim Duesterhus <tim@bastelstu.be>
-Date: Fri Jan 4 00:11:59 2019 +0100
-
- BUG/MINOR: stick_table: Prevent conn_cur from underflowing
-
- When using the peers feature a race condition could prevent
- a connection from being properly counted. When this connection
- exits it is being "uncounted" nonetheless, leading to a possible
- underflow (-1) of the conn_curr stick table entry in the following
- scenario :
-
- - Connect to peer A (A=1, B=0)
- - Peer A sends 1 to B (A=1, B=1)
- - Kill connection to A (A=0, B=1)
- - Connect to peer B (A=0, B=2)
- - Peer A sends 0 to B (A=0, B=0)
- - Peer B sends 0/2 to A (A=?, B=0)
- - Kill connection to B (A=?, B=-1)
- - Peer B sends -1 to A (A=-1, B=-1)
-
- This fix may be backported to all supported branches.
-
- (cherry picked from commit 8b87c01c4d59247d9fb51a38cd12d5d94324b6a4)
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit 4ceecc8a4ee6f46f20c7729056e14af5a8757121)
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/include/proto/session.h b/include/proto/session.h
-index f48c0d4f..7265f5a7 100644
---- a/include/proto/session.h
-+++ b/include/proto/session.h
-@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ static inline void session_store_counters(struct session *sess)
- if (ptr) {
- HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
-
-- stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
-+ if (stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur) > 0)
-+ stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
-
- HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
-
-diff --git a/include/proto/stream.h b/include/proto/stream.h
-index 8521957e..c9bcac37 100644
---- a/include/proto/stream.h
-+++ b/include/proto/stream.h
-@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ static inline void stream_store_counters(struct stream *s)
- if (ptr) {
- HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
-
-- stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
-+ if (stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur) > 0)
-+ stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
-
- HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
-
-@@ -142,7 +143,8 @@ static inline void stream_stop_content_counters(struct stream *s)
- if (ptr) {
- HA_RWLOCK_WRLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
-
-- stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
-+ if (stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur) > 0)
-+ stktable_data_cast(ptr, conn_cur)--;
-
- HA_RWLOCK_WRUNLOCK(STK_SESS_LOCK, &ts->lock);
-
+++ /dev/null
-commit 1c95076d881b7508a8d0819b1cfd642e364b255c
-Author: Jérôme Magnin <jmagnin@haproxy.com>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 11:27:40 2019 +0100
-
- BUG/MINOR: server: don't always trust srv_check_health when loading a server state
-
- When we load health values from a server state file, make sure what we assign
- to srv->check.health actually matches the state we restore.
-
- This should be backported as far as 1.6.
-
- (cherry picked from commit f57afa453a685cfd92b7a27ef6e6035cb384ff57)
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit 75455a0b78ce4ac723698df26c014b38467843b1)
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
-index a86db3db..28414780 100644
---- a/src/server.c
-+++ b/src/server.c
-@@ -2843,16 +2843,37 @@ static void srv_update_state(struct server *srv, int version, char **params)
- HA_SPIN_LOCK(SERVER_LOCK, &srv->lock);
- /* recover operational state and apply it to this server
- * and all servers tracking this one */
-+ srv->check.health = srv_check_health;
- switch (srv_op_state) {
- case SRV_ST_STOPPED:
- srv->check.health = 0;
- srv_set_stopped(srv, "changed from server-state after a reload", NULL);
- break;
- case SRV_ST_STARTING:
-+ /* If rise == 1 there is no STARTING state, let's switch to
-+ * RUNNING
-+ */
-+ if (srv->check.rise == 1) {
-+ srv->check.health = srv->check.rise + srv->check.fall - 1;
-+ srv_set_running(srv, "", NULL);
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ if (srv->check.health < 1 || srv->check.health >= srv->check.rise)
-+ srv->check.health = srv->check.rise - 1;
- srv->next_state = srv_op_state;
- break;
- case SRV_ST_STOPPING:
-- srv->check.health = srv->check.rise + srv->check.fall - 1;
-+ /* If fall == 1 there is no STOPPING state, let's switch to
-+ * STOPPED
-+ */
-+ if (srv->check.fall == 1) {
-+ srv->check.health = 0;
-+ srv_set_stopped(srv, "changed from server-state after a reload", NULL);
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ if (srv->check.health < srv->check.rise ||
-+ srv->check.health > srv->check.rise + srv->check.fall - 2)
-+ srv->check.health = srv->check.rise;
- srv_set_stopping(srv, "changed from server-state after a reload", NULL);
- break;
- case SRV_ST_RUNNING:
-@@ -2906,7 +2927,6 @@ static void srv_update_state(struct server *srv, int version, char **params)
- srv->last_change = date.tv_sec - srv_last_time_change;
- srv->check.status = srv_check_status;
- srv->check.result = srv_check_result;
-- srv->check.health = srv_check_health;
-
- /* Only case we want to apply is removing ENABLED flag which could have been
- * done by the "disable health" command over the stats socket
+++ /dev/null
-commit 7a74ffef9f356304b46ab862858cead85d451b5f
-Author: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 14:15:50 2019 +0100
-
- BUG/MINOR: check: Wake the check task if the check is finished in wake_srv_chk()
-
- With tcp-check, the result of the check is set by the function tcpcheck_main()
- from the I/O layer. So it is important to wake up the check task to handle the
- result and finish the check. Otherwise, we will wait the task timeout to handle
- the result of a tcp-check, delaying the next check by as much.
-
- This patch also fixes a problem about email alerts reported by PiBa-NL (Pieter)
- on the ML [1] on all versions since the 1.6. So this patch must be backported
- from 1.9 to 1.6.
-
- [1] https://www.mail-archive.com/haproxy@formilux.org/msg32190.html
-
- (cherry picked from commit 774c486cece942570b6a9d16afe236a16ee12079)
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit 3722dfbbfadf8f83f82feb3e67fbe482a5c94840)
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/src/checks.c b/src/checks.c
-index 74958b2d..e04f1146 100644
---- a/src/checks.c
-+++ b/src/checks.c
-@@ -1403,12 +1403,13 @@ static int wake_srv_chk(struct conn_stream *cs)
- }
-
- if (check->result != CHK_RES_UNKNOWN) {
-- /* We're here because nobody wants to handle the error, so we
-- * sure want to abort the hard way.
-- */
-+ /* Check complete or aborted. If connection not yet closed do it
-+ * now and wake the check task up to be sure the result is
-+ * handled ASAP. */
- conn_sock_drain(conn);
- cs_close(cs);
- ret = -1;
-+ task_wakeup(check->task, TASK_WOKEN_IO);
- }
-
- HA_SPIN_UNLOCK(SERVER_LOCK, &check->server->lock);
+++ /dev/null
-commit b68a427a236e7b9b0cf8b1c4a5360d960cdf9458
-Author: Dirkjan Bussink <d.bussink@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:35:03 2019 -0800
-
- BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Fix handling of TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate messages
-
- In OpenSSL 1.1.1 TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate messages will trigger the callback
- that is used to verify renegotiation is disabled. This means that these
- KeyUpdate messages fail. In OpenSSL 1.1.1 a better mechanism is
- available with the SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION flag that disables any TLS
- 1.2 and earlier negotiation.
-
- So if this SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION flag is available, instead of having
- a manual check, trust OpenSSL and disable the check. This means that TLS
- 1.3 KeyUpdate messages will work properly.
-
- Reported-By: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
- (cherry picked from commit 526894ff3925d272c13e57926aa6b5d9d8ed5ee3)
- [wt: gh issue #24; Needs to be backported till 1.8]
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit 062c5a190d50c4aa9c5bde88c8c5c85c5f15fc7b)
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
-index 7884c411..7736c324 100644
---- a/src/ssl_sock.c
-+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
-@@ -1406,6 +1406,10 @@ void ssl_sock_infocbk(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)
- BIO *write_bio;
- (void)ret; /* shut gcc stupid warning */
-
-+#ifndef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
-+ /* Please note that BoringSSL defines this macro to zero so don't
-+ * change this to #if and do not assign a default value to this macro!
-+ */
- if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) {
- /* Disable renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) */
- if ((conn->flags & (CO_FL_CONNECTED | CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS | CO_FL_EARLY_DATA)) == CO_FL_CONNECTED) {
-@@ -1413,6 +1417,7 @@ void ssl_sock_infocbk(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)
- conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_RENEG;
- }
- }
-+#endif
-
- if ((where & SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) == SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) {
- if (!(conn->xprt_st & SSL_SOCK_ST_FL_16K_WBFSIZE)) {
-@@ -3806,6 +3811,11 @@ ssl_sock_initial_ctx(struct bind_conf *bind_conf)
- options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
- if (bind_conf->ssl_options & BC_SSL_O_PREF_CLIE_CIPH)
- options &= ~SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
-+
-+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
-+ options |= SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
-+#endif
-+
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, options);
-
- #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010000fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC)
+++ /dev/null
-commit 2e405726a0c6be6617905522bde9038f75e623c4
-Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 10:02:15 2019 +0100
-
- DOC: mention the effect of nf_conntrack_tcp_loose on src/dst
-
- On rare occasions the logs may report inverted src/dst when using
- conntrack with this sysctl. Add a mention for it in the doc. More
- info here :
-
- https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg544878.html
-
- (cherry picked from commit 64ded3db2c686bad582cf9bb9fcabf21cb4becb7)
- Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- (cherry picked from commit 037f9ac4a2cc4b344859af1cff7b30d5ecabe9e0)
- Signed-off-by: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
-
-diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
-index 72b769a4..bc8ae4f8 100644
---- a/doc/configuration.txt
-+++ b/doc/configuration.txt
-@@ -13822,7 +13822,12 @@ dst : ip
- which is the address the client connected to. It can be useful when running
- in transparent mode. It is of type IP and works on both IPv4 and IPv6 tables.
- On IPv6 tables, IPv4 address is mapped to its IPv6 equivalent, according to
-- RFC 4291.
-+ RFC 4291. When the incoming connection passed through address translation or
-+ redirection involving connection tracking, the original destination address
-+ before the redirection will be reported. On Linux systems, the source and
-+ destination may seldom appear reversed if the nf_conntrack_tcp_loose sysctl
-+ is set, because a late response may reopen a timed out connection and switch
-+ what is believed to be the source and the destination.
-
- dst_conn : integer
- Returns an integer value corresponding to the number of currently established
-@@ -14127,7 +14132,13 @@ src : ip
- behind a proxy. However if the "accept-proxy" or "accept-netscaler-cip" bind
- directive is used, it can be the address of a client behind another
- PROXY-protocol compatible component for all rule sets except
-- "tcp-request connection" which sees the real address.
-+ "tcp-request connection" which sees the real address. When the incoming
-+ connection passed through address translation or redirection involving
-+ connection tracking, the original destination address before the redirection
-+ will be reported. On Linux systems, the source and destination may seldom
-+ appear reversed if the nf_conntrack_tcp_loose sysctl is set, because a late
-+ response may reopen a timed out connection and switch what is believed to be
-+ the source and the destination.
-
- Example:
- # add an HTTP header in requests with the originating address' country
+++ /dev/null
---- a/src/ssl_sock.c
-+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
- #include <netdb.h>
- #include <netinet/tcp.h>
-
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <openssl/ssl.h>
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
-@@ -60,6 +61,17 @@
- #include <openssl/async.h>
- #endif
-
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION
-+#define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
-+#define OpenSSL_version(x) SSLeay_version(x)
-+#define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
-+#endif
-+
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
-+#define X509_getm_notBefore X509_get_notBefore
-+#define X509_getm_notAfter X509_get_notAfter
-+#endif
-+
- #include <import/lru.h>
- #include <import/xxhash.h>
-
-@@ -217,7 +229,7 @@ static struct {
- .capture_cipherlist = 0,
- };
-
--#ifdef USE_THREAD
-+#if defined(USE_THREAD) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
-
- static HA_RWLOCK_T *ssl_rwlocks;
-
-@@ -1716,8 +1728,8 @@ ssl_sock_do_create_cert(const char *servername, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, SSL
- ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(newcrt), HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&ssl_ctx_serial, 1));
-
- /* Set duration for the certificate */
-- if (!X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(newcrt), (long)-60*60*24) ||
-- !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newcrt),(long)60*60*24*365))
-+ if (!X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(newcrt), (long)-60*60*24) ||
-+ !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(newcrt),(long)60*60*24*365))
- goto mkcert_error;
-
- /* set public key in the certificate */
-@@ -6299,7 +6311,7 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_x_notafter(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char
- goto out;
-
- smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
-- if (ssl_sock_get_time(X509_get_notAfter(crt), smp_trash) <= 0)
-+ if (ssl_sock_get_time(X509_getm_notAfter(crt), smp_trash) <= 0)
- goto out;
-
- smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash;
-@@ -6399,7 +6411,7 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_x_notbefore(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char
- goto out;
-
- smp_trash = get_trash_chunk();
-- if (ssl_sock_get_time(X509_get_notBefore(crt), smp_trash) <= 0)
-+ if (ssl_sock_get_time(X509_getm_notBefore(crt), smp_trash) <= 0)
- goto out;
-
- smp->data.u.str = *smp_trash;
-@@ -8976,10 +8988,12 @@ static void __ssl_sock_init(void)
- #endif
-
- xprt_register(XPRT_SSL, &ssl_sock);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
- SSL_library_init();
-+#endif
- cm = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
- sk_SSL_COMP_zero(cm);
--#ifdef USE_THREAD
-+#if defined(USE_THREAD) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
- ssl_locking_init();
- #endif
- #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL && !defined OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
-@@ -9008,8 +9022,8 @@ static void __ssl_sock_init(void)
- #else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
- OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
- "\nRunning on OpenSSL version : %s%s",
-- SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION),
-- ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ^ SSLeay()) >> 8) ? " (VERSIONS DIFFER!)" : "");
-+ OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION),
-+ ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ^ OpenSSL_version_num()) >> 8) ? " (VERSIONS DIFFER!)" : "");
- #endif
- memprintf(&ptr, "%s\nOpenSSL library supports TLS extensions : "
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
-@@ -9100,12 +9114,14 @@ static void __ssl_sock_deinit(void)
- }
- #endif
-
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
- ERR_remove_state(0);
- ERR_free_strings();
-
- EVP_cleanup();
-+#endif
-
--#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
- CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
- #endif
- }
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