arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2
authorJayachandran C <jnair@caviumnetworks.com>
Fri, 19 Jan 2018 12:22:47 +0000 (04:22 -0800)
committerCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Tue, 23 Jan 2018 19:59:20 +0000 (19:59 +0000)
Use PSCI based mitigation for speculative execution attacks targeting
the branch predictor. We use the same mechanism as the one used for
Cortex-A CPUs, we expect the PSCI version call to have a side effect
of clearing the BTBs.

Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jayachandran C <jnair@caviumnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c

index 54e41dfe41f669ec1c19b1f84772f6dfb5bb89b5..ed688188223175428af83dd288e8d8c6408e78a1 100644 (file)
@@ -359,6 +359,16 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
                .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT,
                MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1),
        },
+       {
+               .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
+               MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN),
+               .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+       },
+       {
+               .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
+               MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2),
+               .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+       },
 #endif
        {
        }