From: Jozsef Kadlecsik Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2012 09:55:54 +0000 (+0000) Subject: netfilter: Validate the sequence number of dataless ACK packets as well X-Git-Url: http://git.cdn.openwrt.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=4a70bbfaef0361d27272629d1a250a937edcafe4;p=openwrt%2Fstaging%2Fblogic.git netfilter: Validate the sequence number of dataless ACK packets as well We spare nothing by not validating the sequence number of dataless ACK packets and enabling it makes harder off-path attacks. See: "Reflection scan: an Off-Path Attack on TCP" by Jan Wrobel, http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2074 Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c index aba98f942979..e046b3756aab 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c @@ -630,15 +630,9 @@ static bool tcp_in_window(const struct nf_conn *ct, ack = sack = receiver->td_end; } - if (seq == end - && (!tcph->rst - || (seq == 0 && state->state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT))) + if (tcph->rst && seq == 0 && state->state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT) /* - * Packets contains no data: we assume it is valid - * and check the ack value only. - * However RST segments are always validated by their - * SEQ number, except when seq == 0 (reset sent answering - * SYN. + * RST sent answering SYN. */ seq = end = sender->td_end;