From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2017 04:11:54 +0000 (-0800)
Subject: bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()
X-Git-Url: http://git.cdn.openwrt.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=95a762e2c8c9;p=openwrt%2Fstaging%2Fblogic.git

bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()

Distinguish between
BPF_ALU64|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, sign-extended to 64-bit)
and BPF_ALU|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, zero-padded to 64-bit);
only perform sign extension in the first case.

Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.

Debian assigned CVE-2017-16995 for this issue.

v3:
 - add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)

Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
---

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 625e358ca765..c086010ae51e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2408,7 +2408,13 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 			 * remember the value we stored into this reg
 			 */
 			regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
-			__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
+			if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
+				__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
+						 insn->imm);
+			} else {
+				__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
+						 (u32)insn->imm);
+			}
 		}
 
 	} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {