From: Baoquan He Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2016 20:55:43 +0000 (-0700) Subject: x86/KASLR: Drop CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET X-Git-Url: http://git.cdn.openwrt.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=e8581e3d67788b6b29d055fa42c6cb5b258fee64;p=openwrt%2Fstaging%2Fblogic.git x86/KASLR: Drop CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET Currently CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET is used to limit the maximum offset for kernel randomization. This limit doesn't need to be a CONFIG since it is tied completely to KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE, and will make no sense once physical and virtual offsets are randomized separately. This patch removes CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET and consolidates the Kconfig help text. [kees: rewrote changelog, dropped KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE_DEFAULT, rewrote help] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: H.J. Lu Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Yinghai Lu Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1461185746-8017-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 2dc18605831f..5892d549596d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1932,54 +1932,38 @@ config RELOCATABLE (CONFIG_PHYSICAL_START) is used as the minimum location. config RANDOMIZE_BASE - bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image" + bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR)" depends on RELOCATABLE default n ---help--- - Randomizes the physical and virtual address at which the - kernel image is decompressed, as a security feature that - deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location - of kernel internals. + In support of Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR), + this randomizes the physical address at which the kernel image + is decompressed and the virtual address where the kernel + image is mapped, as a security feature that deters exploit + attempts relying on knowledge of the location of kernel + code internals. + + The kernel physical and virtual address can be randomized + from 16MB up to 1GB on 64-bit and 512MB on 32-bit. (Note that + using RANDOMIZE_BASE reduces the memory space available to + kernel modules from 1.5GB to 1GB.) + + Entropy is generated using the RDRAND instruction if it is + supported. If RDTSC is supported, its value is mixed into + the entropy pool as well. If neither RDRAND nor RDTSC are + supported, then entropy is read from the i8254 timer. + + Since the kernel is built using 2GB addressing, and + PHYSICAL_ALIGN must be at a minimum of 2MB, only 10 bits of + entropy is theoretically possible. Currently, with the + default value for PHYSICAL_ALIGN and due to page table + layouts, 64-bit uses 9 bits of entropy and 32-bit uses 8 bits. + + If CONFIG_HIBERNATE is also enabled, KASLR is disabled at boot + time. To enable it, boot with "kaslr" on the kernel command + line (which will also disable hibernation). - Entropy is generated using the RDRAND instruction if it is - supported. If RDTSC is supported, it is used as well. If - neither RDRAND nor RDTSC are supported, then randomness is - read from the i8254 timer. - - The kernel will be offset by up to RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET, - and aligned according to PHYSICAL_ALIGN. Since the kernel is - built using 2GiB addressing, and PHYSICAL_ALGIN must be at a - minimum of 2MiB, only 10 bits of entropy is theoretically - possible. At best, due to page table layouts, 64-bit can use - 9 bits of entropy and 32-bit uses 8 bits. - - If unsure, say N. - -config RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET - hex "Maximum kASLR offset allowed" if EXPERT - depends on RANDOMIZE_BASE - range 0x0 0x20000000 if X86_32 - default "0x20000000" if X86_32 - range 0x0 0x40000000 if X86_64 - default "0x40000000" if X86_64 - ---help--- - The lesser of RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET and available physical - memory is used to determine the maximal offset in bytes that will - be applied to the kernel when kernel Address Space Layout - Randomization (kASLR) is active. This must be a multiple of - PHYSICAL_ALIGN. - - On 32-bit this is limited to 512MiB by page table layouts. The - default is 512MiB. - - On 64-bit this is limited by how the kernel fixmap page table is - positioned, so this cannot be larger than 1GiB currently. Without - RANDOMIZE_BASE, there is a 512MiB to 1.5GiB split between kernel - and modules. When RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET is above 512MiB, the - modules area will shrink to compensate, up to the current maximum - 1GiB to 1GiB split. The default is 1GiB. - - If unsure, leave at the default value. + If unsure, say N. # Relocation on x86 needs some additional build support config X86_NEED_RELOCS diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c index 7d86c5dd8e99..3ad71a0afa24 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c @@ -217,15 +217,13 @@ static bool mem_avoid_overlap(struct mem_vector *img) return false; } -static unsigned long slots[CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET / - CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN]; +static unsigned long slots[KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN]; static unsigned long slot_max; static void slots_append(unsigned long addr) { /* Overflowing the slots list should be impossible. */ - if (slot_max >= CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET / - CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN) + if (slot_max >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN) return; slots[slot_max++] = addr; @@ -251,7 +249,7 @@ static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry, return; /* Ignore entries entirely above our maximum. */ - if (entry->addr >= CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET) + if (entry->addr >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE) return; /* Ignore entries entirely below our minimum. */ @@ -276,8 +274,8 @@ static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry, region.size -= region.start - entry->addr; /* Reduce maximum size to fit end of image within maximum limit. */ - if (region.start + region.size > CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET) - region.size = CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET - region.start; + if (region.start + region.size > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE) + region.size = KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - region.start; /* Walk each aligned slot and check for avoided areas. */ for (img.start = region.start, img.size = image_size ; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h index 4928cf0d5af0..d5c2f8b40faa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h @@ -47,12 +47,10 @@ * are fully set up. If kernel ASLR is configured, it can extend the * kernel page table mapping, reducing the size of the modules area. */ -#define KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE_DEFAULT (512 * 1024 * 1024) -#if defined(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) && \ - CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE_DEFAULT -#define KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET +#if defined(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) +#define KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE (1024 * 1024 * 1024) #else -#define KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE_DEFAULT +#define KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE (512 * 1024 * 1024) #endif #endif /* _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_DEFS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c index bd7a9b9e2e14..f2ee42d61894 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c @@ -804,9 +804,6 @@ void __init mem_init(void) BUILD_BUG_ON(VMALLOC_START >= VMALLOC_END); #undef high_memory #undef __FIXADDR_TOP -#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE - BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE); -#endif #ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM BUG_ON(PKMAP_BASE + LAST_PKMAP*PAGE_SIZE > FIXADDR_START);